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Controversy
Secular and Islamist Women in
Palestinian Society
Fadwa Allabadi
AL-QUDS UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT This article focuses on the multilayered changes in the lives of
Palestinian women over the years of the first and second Intifadas. On the one
hand, women have become far more actively involved in politics, with a Women’s
Charter being drafted and legislation concerning women’s rights being put on the
political agenda. At the same time, the political shift from a Fatah- to a Hamas-
dominated government has shifted understandings of whether the state should be
secular or Islamist. Paradoxical developments by which Hamas has, on the one
hand, fostered women’s education and job training opportunities, but, on the
other, insisted on women’s subordinate legal status, are reflected within the
Islamist women’s movement. The article discusses the decline in power of the left-
ist and secular political forces, and the resulting political conflicts between the 
earlier secular feminist movement and the more recent ‘Islamist feminism’.
KEY WORDS Fatah ◆ Hamas ◆ Intifada ◆ Islamist feminism ◆ secular feminism ◆
women’s rights
INTRODUCTION
Revolutionary changes have taken place in the lives of Palestinian women
over the past three decades. These changes have dramatically altered
female status and aspects of the gender order, and have been reflected in
the new wave of women’s and feminist movements. The Palestinian
women’s movement, which was launched in early 1978, consists of a
number of distinct types of organizations, including a general union,
committees affiliated to political parties, independent women’s NGOs,
charitable societies and women’s studies and research centres. Linked
through various forms of coordination, these different organizations are
all placed within the framework of a Palestinian women’s movement,
with the specific aim of furthering women’s rights within the context of
Palestinian politics. This political context is further characterized not only
by the change of power from Fatah to Hamas, but, partly in consequence
of this, by a shifting – and indeterminate – climate regarding the model of
state/religious relations to be adopted.
In addition to the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), which
was established in 1965 as a body within the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), a new form of women’s organization emerged in the
late 1970s, known as the women’s committees (mass-based women’s organ-
izations). The initial goal of the women’s committees was to mobilize the
mass of Palestinian women around the dual issues of national rights and
women’s rights. These committees are affiliated to the various Palestinian
factions and political parties. Committees for social work are affiliated to
Fatah. The Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action Committees
(PFWAC) currently consists of two different factions: one is affiliated to the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); the other to the
Palestine Democratic Union (Al-Ittihad al-Dimuqrati al-Filastini, generally
known as the FIDA). The Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees
(UPWC) is affiliated to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP); the Union of Palestinian Working Women’s Committees is affiliated
to the Palestinian People’s Party and Palestinian Union of Women. Most of
these committees are socialist in their political orientation. In the post-Oslo
period,1 the women’s committees have developed various programmes,
such as running a domestic violence hotline, and have been actively cam-
paigning on issues of violence against women, as well as working on issues
of democracy and representation.
Besides the women’s committees, women’s research centres and NGOs,
another form of women’s organization was established in the early 1990s
to meet new needs identified by independent women scholars. These
organizations have different goals. Together with the women’s commit-
tees, they are members of the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee,
which serves as a coordinating and lobbying network, with its main work
focused on the promotion of democracy and women’s political participa-
tion, lobbying/networking, training and establishing a national govern-
ment body for women. Among these are the Women’s Studies Centre and
the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), providing
legal aid services, social work and health advocacy, training and lobbying.
The Women’s Affairs Centre in Gaza conducts research on women’s
issues, runs video and writing courses, provides training and a develop-
ment clinic and organizes public events. All these committees and centres
have branches in all the main cities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and
together constitute the secular women’s movement in Palestine.
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The global escalation in Islamic fundamentalism in the early 1990s has
led to the emergence of a new brand of feminism, which can be called
Islamic feminism. A number of women’s Islamic organizations affiliated
with Hamas and Islamic Jihad were launched, and have attracted legions
of women followers of Islam, giving them control over Hamas-funded
educational and job-training programmes, and encouraging women to fin-
ish school and attend university, yet at the same time restricting their legal
rights to those laid out in the Qur’an. Cheryl Rubenberg describes this
movement as one in which Palestinian Muslim women find a precedent
for a strong Muslim woman in the Qur’an and teachings of Muhammad,
and reject current conservative attitudes about women as false notions
concocted by men attempting to manipulate history and the teachings of
Islam (Rubenberg, 2001). These Islamic groups or ‘Islamic feminists’ are
not part of the secular Palestinian women’s movement, but they are
involved in several programmes together with the secular women’s
groups, such as those related to women’s education, health and poverty.
THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE WOMEN’S
MOVEMENT 
The modern Palestinian feminist movement identifies the Israeli occupa-
tion, and the illegal Wall erected by the Israelis,2 as the main cause of the
many problems that face women and their society, including poverty, illit-
eracy, lack of human rights and unemployment. The ‘Apartheid Wall’ has
exacerbated an already dire situation. Most women in Palestinian society
already faced obstacles to obtaining their social and economic rights as
full citizens. With the Wall, women have become more vulnerable, mar-
ginalized and disenfranchised. The construction of the Wall, together with
the Israeli checkpoints, has had a serious socioeconomic impact on many
Palestinians’ lives, especially those of women and children. The unem-
ployment and poverty created by constructing the Wall on agricultural
land and restricting residents’ movements have impacted heavily on
women’s socioeconomic status. All aspects of their social lives are
affected, and of the 50 percent of the population that live below the
poverty line, most are women.
Women have largely been excluded from the public sphere of employ-
ment, as they have lost access to work in Jerusalem and in Israeli factories.
Yet many women have become the only breadwinner in their families as
they are forced out of their protected domestic domain to seek employ-
ment to sustain their families, while their unemployed husbands stay at
home. Women have also lost access to health care and hospitals; pregnant
women have given birth at checkpoints because they are not allowed to
pass through to go to hospital, and the many delays result in pregnant
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women having miscarriages or stillborn infants, or dying in childbirth.
Many female students have had to drop out of high school and college
due to the difficulties in getting to their educational institutions.
Furthermore, the occupation brings another major problem for women:
sexual assault. Many of them have been assaulted by Israeli soldiers while
in jail as a form of retribution, punishment, humiliation, and even as a
means of eliciting information. Although we live in a permanent emer-
gency situation (with constant threat of Israeli reinvasions), there is no
unity in the women’s movement. Owing to the fragmentation of politics
as well as the accompanying militarization of society, the movement has
experienced several setbacks.
The second issue is the confrontation with fundamentalism, in particu-
lar Hamas, which has exploded over the last 15 years, frustrating secular
women who have worked in politics for decades and who now find many
young women turning to a starkly different Islamic vision of empower-
ment and equality. The promotion of secularism is therefore an important
vehicle to protect society from religion’s intervention in people’s lives,
especially in the face of religion’s increasing access to power. Women’s
rights have become trampled under a new form of patriarchal Islamic
fundamentalism that has swept through the nation, enforcing the wearing
of the traditional Islamic dress, the hijab. The reasons behind this trend are
for some not only an expression of their Islamic faith, but also serve as a
symbol of nationalist identity; however, for others, the hijab is a mark of a
new kind of feminism known as Islamic feminism. Jamila Al-Shanti (the
political visionary in the party’s female ranks, and third ranking candi-
date on the national electoral list of Hamas) talks of Hamas using an inter-
pretation of Islam to push back the boundaries for women, and draw
them more into employment and social activity of all kinds. ‘Hamas will
scrap many of the traditions. People think that Islamic law is about being
veiled and closed and staying at home – but that’s wrong. A woman can
go out veiled and do all kinds of work without any problem.’ She contin-
ues: ‘We will bring back Islamic thought and heritage through the media
and through education. These people will come to understand their cul-
ture. But we will not seize their freedoms from them’ (quoted in Johnston,
2006). In fact, the majority of Palestinians are Muslims, and many will be
content with talk of enhancing the influence of Islam. And particularly in
more conservative Gaza, Hamas is moving very much with the prevailing
social grain. These trends, however, affect secular feminists and their
struggle to achieve women’s rights.
The third issue confronting the women’s movement is their need to
challenge men’s power in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and
the depopulation of women in the public arena. The deprecation of
women’s role in the public sphere is evident in several different dimen-
sions. Islamic groups have utilized an Islamist rhetoric that has negatively
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depicted the role of women in the public sphere, and this has been done
not only by Islamic groups, but also by men in general. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, patriarchal elements in the society began to attack
women’s political involvement and their presence on the streets by restor-
ing disciplinary practices grounded in customary and traditional norms
and taboos. Under the guise of protecting girls and women from public
harm and masculine assaults, male relatives increasingly intervened in
women’s involvement in politics and started to restrict their movement.
Many traditional values were revived, such as the traditional attitude
towards women being dishonoured by participating in the struggle
against occupation, which until this time had been condoned (Heiberg,
1993). Moreover, this patriarchal view towards women moving freely in
the streets unaccompanied by men constituted a threat to a woman’s sex-
ual freedom, possibly leading her to be perceived as a ‘loose’ woman.
Palestinian male nationalists have also endeavoured to rid the political
arena of women. This was already happening in the first administration of
the Palestinian Authority in which there was only one female minister and
one female under-secretary. Women were appointed in a few other high posi-
tions, such as general director and director positions. This pattern of male
exclusivity in Palestinian governance has been repeated in successive cabi-
nets until the most recent cabinet that formed after the conflict with Hamas
over Gaza in 2007, with only three women ministers. What this reveals is that
women have been excluded from participation in the government structure
and from building their future state. Furthermore, Palestinian women were
also excluded from the crucial stages of the peace process, including the Oslo
and Cairo agreements. As a result, the outcomes of the Oslo Accords were
designed by men and neglected women’s specific concerns.
Additionally, the PNA has deployed various laws and regulations that
disenfranchise women even more, such as the passport law, which was
issued in late 1995 and was made in line with the law of other Arab and
Middle Eastern countries. This law requires that a woman receive per-
mission or a signature from her male ‘guardian’ (i.e. her husband, father
or elder brother) on her passport application. Another regulation aimed at
women stated that ‘women and girls who want to obtain a driving licence
must be accompanied by a male guardian during the practical lessons’.
However, the women’s movement has successfully countered both deci-
sions. Another issue challenged by the women’s movement is the
announcement by the Mufti of Palestine encouraging early marriage and
polygamy. He advocated these two practices on the grounds that they
could bring about a cessation of the anticipated adultery and sin that
might result once the political struggle against the Israeli occupation has
ended. The women’s movement opposed this issue and called for an
amendment of the personal status law to raise the age of marriage and to
prohibit polygamy.
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In large part, I believe that this disenfranchisement of women has
resulted from the Palestinian move from nationalist resistance to statehood.
In an international context where affairs of state are primarily the domain
of men, this move necessitated the ‘defeminization’ of the Palestinian polit-
ical leadership. It appears that the very strength of Palestinian women’s
presence in the nationalist public sphere threatened the order that, in the
eyes of men, required a systematic reassertion of male power.
ISLAMIZATION OF PALESTINIAN SOCIETY
Islam as a religion is significant not only in social and economic realms,
but in that it also has an important political message for the liberation and
independence of Palestine. The correlation of nationalism with Islamism
forms the pivot of their loyalty to their state for most Palestinians who
participate in the national resistance movement. The concept of (Arab)
nationalism unifies the Arab world: people feel they are united by the ties
of blood, history, language and shared interests, and aspire to a future
political united entity that is socially and culturally modern and progres-
sive. Islam represents Arabic culture and has been spread by the Arabs
throughout a large part of the world and binds Muslims together in the
belief in God and his Messenger. So it is understandable that Islam as a
religion is thought to be the defining feature of Arab nationalism.
Within the Palestinian context, nationalism is a concept aligned to
Islam as both share a common identity, and many citizens are increas-
ingly asserting that identity in the face of colonization. This gives a sense
of the relationship between religion and politics, and many in Palestinian
society, particularly those participating in the national resistance move-
ment, do believe their loyalty to Islam to be a part of their devotion to
their nation.
Two decades prior to the Oslo Accords, Palestinian society appears to
have been more secular. It also seems that women have tended to be more
secular than men. This certainly was one of my observations in the study I
conducted with a sample of women in the winter of 1996: the majority of
the respondents were believers, but not all were practising, while their hus-
bands or other male family members were highly committed to Islam.
Some of the male relatives of those women that expressed a commitment to
secularism also identified themselves as strong believers and practitioners.
Heiberg (1993) has also observed that women tend to be more secular than
men, and men more religiously activist than women. Among women, there
is a slight decrease in the number of observant Muslims and a correspon-
ding increase in the degree of secularization among those under 50 years of
age. However, the proportion of women who profess sentiments linked to
political Islam seems to remain fairly steady over the generations.
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Although not all nationalists or political activists are dedicated to Islam,
there is a range of religiosity from the secular to the devoutly religious.
Some political activists are religious in both belief and practice, indicated
by religious observance associated with a political religious identity. For
others, religion has a more political significance. Secular activists, on the
other hand, express only political and national identity, and have never
proclaimed any religious political values; these are now very much a
minority group. This has come about because Palestinians were in general
disappointed with the Oslo Accords, and this bred frustration among the
nationalists in general and among women in particular. Because the peace
agreements were not implemented in accordance with accepted legal
frameworks and under the auspices of neutral third parties, the ‘peace
process’ was quickly seen to be a re-entrenchment of the Israeli colonial-
ism and oppression that the Palestinians suffered rather than putting an
end to them. As a result, many secular activists suspended their political
activities and tended to become more religious.
Before the Oslo Accords, the trend towards secularization had already
suffered a sudden reversal in 1988, in the second year of the Intifada. It
seems that secularization has been floundering ever since and experi-
enced further setbacks since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (sec-
ond Intifada) in 2001. One significant point is that secularism and leftist
politics declined overall and the number of women interested in politics
decreased. This is because the frustration at the failure of the peace talks,
as mentioned earlier, caused the number of women mobilized in the
political parties to decline, and many women also gave up their activities
in grassroots organizations. As a result, the women’s movement joined
the second Intifada without the mass-based women’s organizations of
the first Intifada. As social-political conditions had radically changed,
and women’s political participation decreased, and together with the
restrictions imposed by Islamic fundamentalism, their enthusiasm and
hope had waned.
I believe that the deterioration of secularism and leftist politics was
inevitable given that the regression of the revolution facilitated a resur-
gence of reactionary power. Here I use ‘reactionary’ to describe patriar-
chal power, not only that of the right wing or the religious factions, but
also of the secularists and leftists who become reactionary when they lost
their revolutionary characteristics, as happened in the PLO and the PNA
during and after the second Intifada. As the politics of the Intifada became
more difficult, and the goals of national independence and statehood
grew more distant, so the people became more frustrated. I argue that the
undermining of the Palestinian revolution was the main factor in the
growth of a reactionary front (Islamic groups) and the decrease in revolu-
tionary zeal, and explains why the secularist left were receding and being
overtaken by flourishing Islamic political groups.
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Since the Oslo Accords, a lack of ideas and organizational paralysis have
marked left-wing politics, as its leadership lost the ability to mobilize 
people and solve their problems, and failed to introduce an alternative
vision for the new era. Nor did the peace process provide for the legitimate
right to self-determination, the full establishment of a Palestinian state or the
right of refugees to return. Frustration at the first Intifada, and the failure of
the Palestinian political leaders to achieve progress in the peace process gave
rise to disillusionment among the Palestinian people. Additionally, these fac-
tors caused them to turn away from a materialist and social solution and
look instead to the spiritual life, expressing a pious hope that metaphysical
powers might come and rescue them. This situation, however, also paved
the road for the Islamic political groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad to
flourish and to become the most attractive political factions for Palestinians
in general and for ordinary people in particular.
A NEW AGENDA FOR THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT
When the Oslo Accords, also known as the ‘Declaration of Principles’,
were signed in September 1993, Palestinian women had drafted and
approved a ‘Document of Principles on Women’s Legal Status’, also called
the ‘Women’s Charter’ or ‘Women’s Declaration of Principles’. They aimed
to draw up a women’s Bill of Rights for the autonomous period and the
independent state, based on the International Bill of Human Rights and the
UN CEDAW.3
The Charter has served as a basic document for the women’s movement
strategy and action plan, particularly for those groups affiliated to Fatah
and to the left-wing factions. They also use it in their lobbying and net-
working within the Palestinian parliament, the Palestinian Legislative
Council (PLC), to change the legislation relating to women. Secular mem-
bers of the PLC and other NGOs such as the labour movement support
the Charter. Indeed, women have succeeded in achieving the right to be
elected to governing bodies. Within the past decade, Palestinian women
have played a significant role in the 1996 and 2006 national elections.
They succeeded, in 2005, in achieving a legally recognized quota for
women of 20 percent for both the legislative and municipal elections. Two
seats per local council were set aside for women. The quota system has
proven to be an important means of increasing women’s representation
not only in parliament but also in the local councils. It has also given the
political parties an incentive to recruit more women into their ranks, ulti-
mately gaining recognition for a new quota system geared to correct his-
torical gender imbalances in their society.
The quota system guarantees women a greater level of participation in
political life at both the local and parliamentary levels. A marked trend,
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however, is the increased participation of Islamist women in the elections,
in addition to secular women, not only as voters, but also as candidates.
The number of elected women representatives has increased overall. In
the first legislative elections in January 1996, women formed 42 percent of
the electorate. However, they made up only 4 percent of the 688 candi-
dates and won only five seats of the 88 seats on the new Legislative
Council. In the 2006 elections, women accounted for 85 of the 728 candi-
dates on national and district lists and won 22 percent of the seats on the
Legislative Council.
THE DEBATE BETWEEN SECULARIST AND ISLAMIST
FEMINISM
Palestinian women are beset by complexity and contradiction as secular and
Islamist perspectives overlap and impact on their attitudes towards state
structures (Jacoby, 1996). One area considered crucial by Palestinian deci-
sion-makers is the enactment of legislation capable of achieving the declared
national goal of improving the legal status of Palestinians in general and of
women in particular. Debates among Palestinian women have focused on
the high stakes for women in the design of the postcolonial state, which will
have critical impact on women’s public and private lives. The fact is that
Palestinian women are wary of an expected post-independence collabora-
tion between the national state, patriarchy and the religious sector. They are
gravely concerned about ideology and its impact on the legal system
through personal status laws (Graham Brown, 1991), and in particular the
patriarchal system, which thrived under the colonial powers and continues
to permeate state ideology, policy and all social spheres throughout the
Middle East to this day. This has led the women’s movement to call for an
unbiased legal system that considers women on an equal basis with men,
particularly as regards the personal status law. At the same time, the
Palestinian women’s movement claims the right to a political life equal to
men through formal political structures, whether at governmental or 
parliamentary level (WCLAC, 1995).
The question of legislation regarding women and the family has
sparked controversy. Nira Yuval-Davis (1993) suggests that ‘the construc-
tion by the state of relationships in the private domain, namely, marriage
and the family, is what has determined women’s status as citizens within
the public domain’. Islamic women joined with secular women in their
attempts to improve women’s legal status and social positions, but they
disagreed on changing several articles in the personal status law. In this
context, the issue of personal status created controversy between women’s
groups, which highlighted the ideological divisions between secularists
and religious women within Palestinian feminism. The secularists called
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for unbiased legislation. They demanded an alternative civil personal law
to the Shari’a-based personal status law, while the Islamist women insist
on Shari’a as divine law.
Some Muslim feminists suggested modifications to Shari’a law (Hale,
1997), and, in their belief in the possibility of gender equality and minor-
ity rights within an Islamic reformist framework, proposed a compromise
solution, such as a progressive interpretation of Islamic law in a manner
more appropriate to the modern age. Intisar Al-Wazir (Um Jihad), minis-
ter of social affairs in the first Palestinian cabinet in 1996, was unwilling
to provoke a dispute with the PNA or show antagonism to Islamic
groups, and emphasized that ‘we must work to include women’s rights in
the Palestinian constitution, in a way that will not clash with Islamic law’
(The Economist, 1994: 41). In some ways, she approved of Shari’a law, and
her attitude has been supported by Palestinian lawyer Hanan Bakri, who
points out that replacing Shari’a by a civil code for personal status would
create a major crisis (The Economist, 1994).
Other Islamic women rejected any amendments and emphasized that
Islam must be at the core of women’s lives. They also stated that patri-
archy is embodied in Arab customs, not in Islam, and so called for an end
to Arab patriarchy. The secularists, however, rejected the consolidation of
the Shari’a law, as it gives patriarchal authority more power over the pri-
vate sphere of Palestinian civil society. Instead, they argued for a platform
of secular and legal rights for women to be decided in the PLC.
In many Arab societies, as in Palestine, women lobby the state for a sec-
ular family code to free them from the discriminatory Shari’a law. The
right to initiate divorce and the right to maintain custody are still rights
that only men possess, while one male witness remains equivalent to two
females (a practice that rests on the assumption that men are more
rational than women). Secular women called for an amendment to the
marriage law to make divorce equally available to women. In Palestinian
state legislation, religion and customary law circumscribe women’s citi-
zenship rights. While no different from other Middle Eastern states,
where in some contexts ‘gendered citizenship inequities result from the
articulation and conflation of gender discourses of family and religion by
the state’ (Joseph, 1996), the situation regarding Palestinian women is fur-
ther complicated by the nation’s history of oppression and occupation. 
Inheritance is another important issue: Islam grants women the right to
inheritance but not in a manner equal to men. The Islamist women argue
that the religious distinction between a man and a woman is because the
man has a financial responsibility to his family, while the woman is not
expected to contribute financially. The problem is that most women have
not even received the half portion to which they were entitled; while some
women would never even claim their right to an inheritance. Secular
women insist on changing this law because it discriminates against women.
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They demand that the inheritance be divided equally between daughters
and sons.
Shari’a law also discriminates against women in the case of child cus-
tody. A woman can maintain custody of her children until the age of 10,
and then the father is responsible for them. Both secular and Islamist
women have opposed this law, as they believe that no one can look after
children as well as a mother. Only in one aspect do religious women agree
with the law, namely if a divorced or widowed woman remarries then she
cannot keep her children. They have called for an amendment to the law
to extend a woman’s custody of her children until adulthood.
The concept of freedom of movement is another issue raised by secular
women; they oppose any restriction to women’s mobility. However, most
Islamist women believe that women should have their husband’s permis-
sion to travel and unmarried women the permission of their male
guardians (fathers, brothers, grandfathers or uncles). According to the
Palestinian passport law, mentioned earlier, when a widespread debate
on this issue ensued throughout the country, Islamist women supported
the law wholeheartedly. In their words, ‘it is the man’s obligation to pro-
tect his female relatives according to our religion and we must respect
this’. However, the secular women opposed this law and described it as
reactionary and discriminating against women. In support of their view,
they provided instances proving that this law oppresses women and
deprives them of a basic right.
The approach of Islamist feminists is an attempt to transform past ‘tra-
dition’ into a ‘modern’ new language to make the religious laws and doc-
trine accord with women’s demands for liberty and equality in the
present. That is to say, they call on Islam to be a more women-friendly and
gender-egalitarian religion. For example, the PLC’s Hamas-led Women’s
Affairs Committee has been making relentless efforts to guarantee
women’s rights in accordance with the people’s heritage of traditions and
the relevant laws. Prior to taking power, Hamas as a group used to hold
meetings and training sessions for women from all sectors, on issues such
as violence against women, inheritance and divorce (Almeghari, 2007).
SECULAR AND ISLAMIST WOMEN IN THE NATIONAL
ELECTIONS
In 1996, women expressed great joy at practising the right of suffrage for
the first time. Their activities were extraordinary, indicating that when the
national question takes precedence, female consciousness can be trans-
formed into feminism and nationalism. Patriarchal and Muslim societies
believe in gender differences, yet it seems that Palestine women’s atti-
tudes and behaviour during the national elections for president and the
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Legislative Council in 1996 and 2006 challenged this concept of sexual dif-
ference. Regardless of their beliefs, women were enthusiastic about par-
ticipating in the national elections. They played the same role as men did,
encouraging each other to sign onto the electoral register, distributing
pamphlets and election forms, and organizing rallies. Furthermore, they
were involved in campaigning for candidates of both sexes.
Palestinian women were eager to elect women candidates to represent
them on the PLC; however, they were dissatisfied with the limited num-
ber of women candidates. They were not interested merely in suffrage,
but also in equal representation in parliament. During the campaigns in
both national elections, many women expressed their views relating to
women’s right to vote. One woman commented: ‘a few women candi-
dates in the Legislative Council is not enough, we also want more women
members in the Cabinet’ (interview, see Allabadi, 1998: 207).
In the first elections of 1996, Hamas and other religious factions boy-
cotted the elections but they did not prevent their members and support-
ers from voting. Accordingly, some Islamist women participated in the
election campaigns and rallies, trying to influence the audience with an
approach that advocated the Islamic view. One of those women said: ‘We
already have Islam as the best legal system, which grants women all
rights. If the PNA implements Islamic regulations and doctrine we will be
fine’ (interview, see Allabadi, 1998: 207). Since the first national elections
in 1996, it has become obvious that many women in Palestinian society
have a strong commitment to the Islamic faith. It was inspiring to see
women as religious actors defining Islam in theory and practice. On the
theoretical level, this has led many women to think of the possibility of
struggle within Islam and to feel compelled to change and improve
women’s roles and rights within an Islamic framework. They believe that
women can develop democracy using the Islamist feminist approach of
reinterpreting the Qur’an and Sunna. This trend of ‘Islamic feminism’ in
many Islamic countries, as Nayereh Tohidi notes, ‘emerges primarily
among highly educated, middle-class women who are unwilling to break
away from their religious orientation, and hold Islam as a significant
component of their cultural and national identity’ (Tohidi, 2002).
In the first national elections, the argument was between secular femi-
nists and men who wanted to protect their monopoly on political and
social power. Ten years later, in the second national elections in 2006, the
debate turned to one between secular women and Islamist women who
wanted to share political power without changing the traditional role of
women in the family (Cambanis, 2006).
Some issues united women across the secular–religious divide, particu-
larly during the municipal and local council elections in 2004 and 2005
and in the national elections of 2006 as well. Each candidate from the dif-
ferent groups campaigned on a platform prioritizing women’s issues,
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promising to improve educational and job opportunities for women. But
while the election agenda of some women candidates advocated the
Palestinian women’s movement programme for secularization of per-
sonal status law as a key to emancipation and equal citizenship for
women, the Islamist women called for a solution within the Islamic con-
text, calling for the reinterpretation of the Qur’an from a women’s per-
spective. In other words, the debates that emerged prior to and during the
election campaigns tended to highlight the ideological divisions between
secular and religious Palestinian feminists.
Hence, Islamic women’s involvement in the reform process within the
women’s movement in Palestine is in question. I argue that their involve-
ment in politics is an attempt to legitimize the state’s gender policy. In
other words, Islamic feminism works with the political system of Hamas,
which secularist women claim restricts personal freedom. Islamic femi-
nism legitimizes this system, and ignores the repressive contexts of the
social and political climate in Palestine. One Hamas politician, newly
elected in 2006, called for a new law to make all Palestinian women wear
headscarves and to make the segregation of boys and girls obligatory in
schools. Several leaders of Islamic groups have talked about making
Shari’a the only source of all future legislation.
As a final point, I would say that Palestinian women candidates in all
successive elections have been influenced by their political party affilia-
tion. For instance, Islamist women affiliated with Hamas had a strong and
well-funded organization with regional political Islamic support. Women
candidates who were affiliated with Fatah gained power because Fatah is
the mainstream political party in the PNA; while other women candidates
affiliated with leftist parties, such as the People’s Party, the Democratic
Front and the Popular Front, lost the strong political support they had
enjoyed when world socialist parties flourished.
THE SECULAR WOMEN’S AGENDA IN THE 2006
ELECTIONS 
Secular Palestinian women’s groups who ran for office in the 2006 PLC
elections re-evaluated the policies of social, economic and political devel-
opment programmes offered to women, in order to delineate their elec-
tion programmes and to raise the awareness of policy-makers. Their
agenda is based on the struggle for gender equality in issues ranging from
women’s access to employment, education and representation in national
and local government, economic development and establishment of day-
care facilities, to peace activism and struggles against domestic violence.
Lobbying for the increased power of women in the public sphere is at the
heart of the secular agenda. All candidates from secular women’s groups
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shared a general programme that emphasized the participation of women
in decision-making, focusing on defending democracy, protecting the
environment and on agriculture, education and health; and then they had
specific practical demands that reflected the needs of the women and
communities they were running to represent (Miller, 2005).
All secular women’s groups’ projects focus on enhancing the role of
women in leadership positions throughout Palestinian society. This was
remarkable during both the municipal elections of 2004 and 2005 and the
PLC elections in 1996 and 2006. Since then, women’s groups have
regained their position, collaborating with other civil society organiza-
tions and enhancing women’s roles in the political parties. They have
played a significant role in constructing platforms and policies within
their political parties.
The two most controversial points of contention, however, and which dif-
ferentiate secular agendas from more religious ones, are the attack on the
Shari’a personal status laws and the appeal to universal human rights. The
‘application’ of Shari’a laws through the jurisdiction of religious courts in
all matters of personal status has been challenged by secular feminists
attempting to extricate religious influence from state policy (Jacoby, 1996).
THE ISLAMIST WOMEN’S AGENDA ATTRACTS WOMEN
Muslim feminists are intent on upholding Shari’a. Even though agreeing
with certain amendments on the personal status law, their struggle is to
ensure proper implementation of Shari’a. They also focus on adequate lev-
els of education so that women are aware of their legal rights. Islamist fem-
inism in Palestine is the same as other Islamist feminisms in the Middle
East. They construct their discourse on gender by trying to bridge the gap
between tradition and modernity and to reconcile two sets of principles:
the traditional and patriarchal religious conception of women’s nature,
role and rights, and the new modern understanding of Muslim women’s
social and political roles (Tohidi, 2002).
In 1999, Hamas admitted for the first time that women were oppressed
and that they had reason to struggle against discrimination and sexism.
Jamila Al-Shanti, a professor of philosophy at the Islamic University, who
headed the list of Hamas women candidates in the 2006 elections, told The
Guardian that Hamas women needed to tackle discrimination. ‘Our first
job is to correct this because this is not Islam’, Shanti said. ‘We are going to
show that women are not secondary, they are equal to men. Discrimination
is not from Islam, it is from tradition. It may not be easy. Men may not
agree’ (Cambanis, 2006).
Hamas, networking through the mosques and their social services, have
made deep inroads into Palestinian society. In the elections of 2006, the
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Hamas female candidates assumed the mantle of women’s rights. Their
invitation to women to attend religious education inside mosques was
welcomed by the strongly traditional society, where war has decimated
people’s psychological well-being, especially women and children. It was
a chance for women to get out of their homes to take part in relatively
accepted activities. Journalists describe Hamas’s popularity as ‘soaring as
much for its reputation for opening schools and managing essential serv-
ices such as water supplies as for resisting Israeli occupation’ (Booth,
2006). Hamas is also ‘perceived by many Palestinians as a grass-roots
socialist movement capable of developing social welfare programs and
delivering an honest, modest government and effective public services’
(Jabr, 2006: 19–20). Nevertheless, Hamas’s conservative approach to social
issues does also raise questions in some quarters, such as the decision
made by Hamas’s council in Qalqilia to ban an international dance festival
in summer 2007 to prevent social mixing between women and men.
Hamas not only provides job-training programmes for women, but also
programmes that help women to gain both a religious and university edu-
cation. Hamas does not prohibit women from working or from gaining an
education. Many of Hamas’s women members and supporters are pro-
fessional doctors, lawyers, teachers and social workers (Cambanis, 2006).
In fact, Hamas’s programme for women encourages many female stu-
dents to join the Hamas organization in the universities (Bullimore, 2006).
In its election agenda, Hamas addressed women’s rights in education,
work, inheritance and the right to take up decision-making positions. It
emphasized women’s roles in society as equal to men’s roles. Jerusalem
university professor Mariam Saleh, a Hamas candidate, said in a fiery
speech: ‘Women are more pivotal than men because women serve as doc-
tors, scientists, holy warriors, and the heads of families whose men are in
Israeli prisons’ (Cambanis, 2006). However, some of those running for elec-
tion did not necessarily advocate a women-centric agenda, such as Rasha
Al-Rantissi, the widow of Abdelaziz Al-Rantissi, the Hamas leader assassi-
nated by Israel in 2005: ‘She is running on the basis of her husband’s legacy.
A women’s agenda is not part of [Hamas’s] discourse’ (Al-Jazeera, 2006).
In their campaigns and rallies for the local council and municipal elec-
tions in 2004 and 2005 and the 2006 national elections, Islamist candidates
insisted on armed struggle and emphasized that ‘one hand builds, the
other hand fights’. A veil covering their face, they believed that women
should have equal rights in Palestinian society, especially the right to die
in the armed struggle against Israel (Cambanis, 2006). Although the first
female suicide attacks on Israel were undertaken by the secular Al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade in 2002, Hamas deployed its first female suicide bomber
only two years later.
Incidentally, for female suicide bombers, religion was a crucial, but not
the only reason behind the phenomenon of martyrdom; there was also a
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need to identify with a symbol of power and a thirst for revenge (El-
Sarraj, 2001). Many female suicide bombers would have lived in refugee
camps, especially in Gaza, and may have had a father, brother or husband
killed in the Intifada or their family house demolished by Israeli solders.
In all cases, the common elements were a sense of hopelessness, poverty,
unemployment for both women and their male relatives and coming from
a family of refugees with a strong sense of Palestinian identity.
ISLAMIST WOMEN’S ATTITUDES AFTER THE 2006
ELECTIONS
Legislative Council member Miriam Farhat told reporters soon after she
was elected, in January 2006, that women would have to cover their
heads. Yet Hamas’s candidate for prime minister, Ismail Haniyyeh, has
been quick to deny this, saying that ‘Hamas will not force women to wear
the hijab or veil, but will seek to educate and persuade them about the
virtues of Islam and Islamic behaviour’ (Bullimore, 2006).
Huda Nae’em, one of the six Hamas women elected in January 2006, says
‘Palestinian women are closer to the problems of society and this is why
they are looking to Hamas for a solution’. According to Nae’em, women
‘feel well treated by Hamas institutions. Now these women are looking to
us, the women in parliament, to change other things’ (Bullimore, 2006).
Independent Islamists like Majda Fadda, an elected member of the
Nablus city council, are likely to serve as the intermediaries between
the secular and religious female factions in the Palestinian government.
The majority of women are Muslims but they are not affiliated with
Hamas, they are not highly religious but nevertheless do not support
the secular vision.
SECULAR WOMEN’S REACTION AND ATTITUDES AFTER
THE 2006 ELECTIONS
In the pre-elections for the Legislative Council in 2006, secular feminists
were afraid that if Hamas won the elections, they would lose what they
had achieved in the sphere of social life. Mona El-Farra from Gaza said: ‘If
Hamas is elected it would be disastrous for us, they will not bring stabil-
ity, and socially they are not progressive’ (BBC, 2006). She was not the
only one who was worried; many other secular feminists shared her dis-
tress, because they did not want to be subjected to religious restrictions.
For example, Bitar, who was running for the Palestinian legislature on a
secular slate called ‘The Third Way’ and committed to a democratic system,
said: ‘I won’t be happy in a system dominated by Hamas, but I have to
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accept the results of the election. . . . But we don’t want religion to domi-
nate our life’ (Cambanis, 2006).
Another woman, Abu Samaan, who supports the secular radical group
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, declared: ‘I respect
Hamas women candidates, I respect their ideology, but I don’t want them
to dictate things to me’ (‘Women a Striking Presence’, 2006). While NGO
worker Lama Hourani entirely rejected accepting Hamas in the govern-
ment, saying: ‘I do not agree with their political or social programmes. I
am secular and do not believe in their way of struggle, and they depend
on religious ideologies and not democracy’ (BBC, 2006).
Finally, professor of women’s studies Eileen Kuttab asserted: ‘Hamas
know that if they make us abide by Islamic tenets and not by secular ones,
it won’t be accepted and they stand to lose support.’ She affirmed that the
struggle of the women’s movement will continue until the Palestinians
decide on the model they are looking for – ‘whether an Arab or an Islamic
or a democratic state’ (Rajalakshmi, 2006).
CONCLUSION
Since the Oslo Accords, paucity of ideas and organizational paralysis
have marked secular and left-wing Palestinian politics, as its leadership
has lost the ability to mobilize people and solve their problems. They have
not introduced an alternative vision for the new era. The peace process
did not address the legitimate right to self-determination, the full estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state or the right of refugees to return.
Frustration from the first Intifada and the failure of the Palestinian politi-
cal leadership to achieve progress in the peace process has given rise to
disillusionment among Palestinians. Additionally, it has caused them to
turn away from an economic and social solution and to look instead to the
spiritual life, expressing hope for a metaphysical power to offer a solu-
tion. This has predictably paved the road for the Islamic political groups
to flourish and to become the most attractive alternative for Palestinians
in general and for the majority population at the most vulnerable end of
the economic spectrum, in particular.
It seems that the struggle within Islam itself is momentous if women
are to achieve their rights. Haleh Afshar describes Islam as a potentially
positive model for women’s struggle, and she deconstructs religious tex-
tual reference to demonstrate a wealth of rights bestowed on women by
the Qur’an in areas of marriage, divorce and inheritance, in opposition to
the restrictive customs practised in Muslim societies (Afshar, 1984). One
can hypothesize that it is reasonable to support the Muslim feminists’
attempt to construct an alternative feminist agenda from within a reinter-
preted Islamic framework (Rai and Lievesley, 1996), as this is possible if
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women’s perspectives are used to reinterpret the Qur’anic verses and
Sunna. It is an appropriate interpretation for a society in which the major-
ity of Muslim women are highly committed to Islam, and believe that
Islam granted women the same rights as men (but that the patriarchal
society has denied these rights).
It is in this sense that one can argue that Islamization and gender poli-
tics in Palestine are now closely intertwined, but I remain sceptical as to
whether this will help women to gain – at least – the rights Islam has
given them. However, I doubt that the new approach of reinterpreting the
Qur’an will resolve all women’s issues: it will, at best, be an interim solu-
tion. My suspicion is that in the long run its outcome will never give a
woman her full rights to equal citizenship. Moghadam asserts that ‘it is
hard to defend as feminist the view that women can attain equal status
only in the context of Islam. This is a fundamentalist view, not one com-
patible with feminism’ (Moghadam, 2002: 1164).
On the other hand, I wonder whether the PNA will accept the integra-
tion of such a new interpretation into state legislation. If so, would
Palestinian men accept this, not only in theory but also in practice? I
believe that such legal change will be successful only if social change
takes place, and women from Fatah and other secular parties must bridge
a major cultural divide to cooperate in government and social services
with the religious women from Hamas.
NOTES
1. The ‘Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements’,
the so-called Oslo Accords, were finalized in Oslo, Norway on 20 August
1993, and officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington, DC on 13
September 1993. It was the first direct, face-to-face agreement between Israel
and the Palestinians. It was also a framework for the future relations
between Israel and the anticipated Palestine state. The Accords provided for
the creation of a Palestinian Authority (PNA). The Palestinian Authority
had responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. It
also called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza Strip
and West Bank.
2. The separation wall, or segregation wall, erected by Israel is also referred to
as the ‘Apartheid Wall’ by critics of Israeli policy. Construction of the Wall,
including land confiscation and the uprooting of trees, began in June 2002,
near the village of Salem, west of Jenin. On 10 July 2005, the Israeli cabinet
approved the construction of the Wall in Jerusalem, due to be completed by
September 2005. The Apartheid Wall is around 8 m high and probably 1000
km long. The Wall separates the Palestinians, and serves a purpose that goes
way beyond any Israeli security needs. The Wall consolidates Israel’s illegal
settlements through the (once more) illegal confiscation of land. The Wall
severs the ties of thousands of Palestinians from their homes, schools, fam-
ilies, towns, farms and water. Most of the Wall’s route runs within the
Palestinians’ West Bank. As a result, the Wall along this part of the route
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infringes the human rights of more than 210,000 Palestinians, living in 67
towns and villages. For more see: www.passia.org/links-Wall.htm,
http://www.auphr.org/thewall, electronicintifada.net/bytopic/apartheid-
wall.shtml.
3. In this document Palestinian women addressed the social inequalities they
face; they also stressed the ‘bitter experiences’ that have ‘made Palestinian
women conscious of the specificity of women’s issues which are linked to the
struggle for justice, democracy, equality, and development’ (GUPW, 1994:
197). The Charter demonstrates how closely the women’s movement is tied
to the nationalist movement: ‘The efforts of Palestinian women as well as all
democratic forces in Palestinian society must unite to remove all obstacles
hindering the equality of women with men. We must work hand in hand
towards a democratic society which fulfils a comprehensive national inde-
pendence, social justice, and equality’ (Sabbagh, 1996). The Charter essen-
tially delineated gender equivalence and a secular vision of women’s rights.
In addition to political campaigning and strategies for getting women
elected to governing bodies, the agenda included personal status laws. It
included legislation to protect the rights of women and to guarantee equal
access to opportunities, educational curricula sensitive to gender issues,
health care and family planning services that give women control over their
bodies and respect their rights to reproductive freedom and choice (Avgar,
1993). In their adoption of the UN CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), the women who drafted the
Charter called for an end to discriminatory legislation against women, legal
protection against family violence and restrictions of women’s freedom and
a woman’s right to pass on citizenship to a husband and children.
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